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In recent years, the complex network as the frontier of complex system has received more and more attention. Peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks with openness, anonymity, and dynamic nature are vulnerable and are easily attacked by peers with malicious behaviors.
Building trusted relationships among peers in a large-scale distributed P2P system is a fundamental and challenging research topic.
Based on interpersonal relationships among peers of large-scale P2P networks, we present prevention and trust evaluation scheme,
called IRTrust.The framework incorporates a strategy of identity authentication and a global trust of peers to improve the ability of
resisting the malicious behaviors. It uses the quality of service (QoS), quality of recommendation (QoR), and comprehensive risk
factor to evaluate the trustworthiness of a peer, which is applicable for large-scale unstructured P2P networks.The proposed IRTrust
can defend against several kinds of malicious attacks, such as simple malicious attacks, collusive attacks, strategic attacks, and sybil
attacks. Our simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides greater accuracy and stronger resistance compared with
existing global trust schemes. The proposed scheme has potential application in secure P2P network coding.
1. Introduction
In P2P networks, due to their characteristics of openness,
anonymity, and dynamic nature of P2P networks without
verifications, peers can freely join in and leave the systems,
which leads to a P2P system being vulnerable and easily
attacked bymalicious peers [1–16]. In P2P systems about 50%
of the network peers perform malicious behaviors, which
are providing false services, spreading malicious codes or
viruses, and so forth [1, 4, 5, 10, 11]. In order to encourage
and stimulate peers to participate in the system, it is very
important to ensure the authenticity of shared resources and
to resist malicious peers. One approach is building trust
and reputation management to promote a good collaborative
relationship among peers in the P2P systems. In these trust
and reputation systems, the twomatters of prime importance
are ensuring the highly accurate trustworthiness of calcu-
lating trust and being robust to malicious peers. Currently,
most trust and reputation systems focus on evaluating the
credibility of resource providers [1–16], but in the absence
of any central authority, repository, and global information
there is no silver bullet for securing P2P networks [5, 10, 11].
In this paper, we present a prevention and trust evaluation
scheme based on interpersonal relationships for large-scale
P2P networks. The major contributions of this paper are as
follows.
First, although some existing schemes consider the
weights of peers, they believe that the weights of those peers
with high credibility are greater than those of the peers with
low credibility in the trust computing. From the point of
view of interpersonal relationships, this view may not be
completely reasonable. We put forward that the weights of
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the peers who are familiar with the request peer are greater
than those of the peers who are not. We also believe that the
early experiences have a small impact on the trust evaluation,
whereas the recent experiences contribute more.
Second, when it comes to the trust of peers, the existing
schemes take it for granted that theQoS is equal to credibility.
As a consequence, a request peer evaluates only theQoS of the
provider. Considering the recommendation of other peers,
the request peer merely considers the credibility of these
peers, and how to calculate the credibility is very complex.
In response to this problem, we distinguish QoS and QoR
among peers. For one specific transaction, we propose that
the request peer evaluates the QoS of the service provider
and the QoR of the recommenders as well, which can easily
improve the ability of resisting malicious behaviors.
Third, in order to prevent and describe the unpredictable
and uncertain behaviors from malicious peers, we take all
risk factors into consideration such as peer’s trust value,
context, transactions, and the accumulated speed of trust
included. The risk value is used to prevent and measure
variousmalicious behaviors, such as fluctuating behavior and
misusage of trust. In our design, the weights of the risk
factor are adjustable so that they can be effectively applied to
different environments with different requirements.
2. Related Works
The main problem of reputation systems is how to deal with
trust networks [13]. A trust network is a virtual network
on top of a P2P system as shown in Figure 1, in which the
bottom layer is the physical entities composed of the terminal
machines, the middle layer is the logic layer of P2P systems,
and the top layer is the trust layer composed of the trust
ratings after peers’ transactions.
The EigenTrust scheme [1] computes a global trust value
for a peer by performing a distributed algorithm approaching
the eigenvector of the trust matrix over the peers.The scheme
relies on a reliable selection of some pretrust peers, who are
supposed to be trusted by all peers and have higher trust.
This assumption may not always be matched in a distributed
computing environment. Because the pretrust peers may not
exist lastly, and once they behave any malicious actions and
score badly after some transactions, the systemmay not work
reliably.
In a PeerTrust scheme [2], Xiong and Liu proposed three
basic trust parameters and two adaptive factors to compute
the trustworthiness of peers. They incorporated the concepts
of a trust value and similaritywith itself to compute credibility
and satisfaction. The trustworthiness of a peer is considered
to be a mean value of the evaluation of peers’ behaviors,
while the evaluation is given by the nearby peers. However,
the limitation of this approach is that the computation
convergence rate in large-scale P2P systems is not provided.
The five factors used in their trust scheme may be retrieved
with a heavy overhead.
In a R2Trust scheme [10], peers’ trust values are evaluated
from direct interactions and peers referrals. The scheme
The broken line denotes the trust ratings.
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Figure 1: Trust overlay networks for a P2P system (color online).
distinguishes the credibility of peers. As a result, the aggre-
gated trust value will filter out the noises and provide more
accurate trust values. It can defend against several malicious
attacks, such as simple malicious attacks, collusive attacks,
and strategic attacks. But it has not taken measures to
restrain fake and sybil attacks [17–19]. Li et al. [11] proposed
multiple factors to be incorporated to reflect the complexity
of trust. The weighted moving average and ordered weighted
averaging combination algorithms can dynamically assign
the properties (weights) of the multiple factors and calculate
a more accurate trust value. But they did not give detailed
analysis about resisting against peers’ malicious behaviors of
the scheme.
The above P2P trust and reputation systems are based on
the assumption that the better the peer’s QoS is, the higher the
reputation of the peer is. These schemes only use a one-sided
trust factor to quantify and predict trustworthiness among
peers, which leads to lower resistance to malicious behaviors.
In this paper, considering the interpersonal relationships
among peers, the reputation of the peer is divided into service
trust and recommendation trust. In addition, we put forward
the comprehensive risk factors to prevent the malicious
behaviors and propose a robust and efficient P2P reputation
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Figure 2: System structure of the prevention and trust evaluation
scheme (color online).
system. We construct a mathematic scheme to discuss the
capacity of resisting against malicious behaviors. Finally, we
conduct simulations to illustrate them.
3. The Prevention and Trust
Evaluation Scheme
In this section, we will present the basic framework of the
prevention and trust evaluation scheme in detail.
3.1. Basic Framework. The behaviors of the network peers are
determined by the operators and the peers should reflect the
characteristics of operators. Based on the various roles in P2P
systems, peers can be divided into three types: service node
(SN), request node (RN), and recommendation node (RC).
SN represents the peers who provide services for others in
the networks, RN is the peers who request services, and RC
denotes the peers who had transactions with SN in the past
and recommend feedback to others. The detailed framework
is shown in Figure 2.
Before a request node deals with a service node, the
request node needs to consider three factors: the history
records, the recommendation information, and the compre-
hensive risk factor. The decision information formed by the
three factors through a trust evaluation function is sent to the
request node.Then the request node determines whether the
transaction is with the service node or not.
A peer enters the system with a unique identity, and it
needs to be authenticated to communicate with other peers.
When a new peer joins the P2P system, it cannot gain all
the authority. It can only provide services to other peers, and
when the number of the services is greater than the initial
threshold (𝜙), the new peer can enter into the normal trust
accumulation. With an the increase of the trust, the peer
will have more authority. The accumulation of the trust is
very slow, and once the peer has malicious behaviors, the
accumulated trust is quickly reduced. Once a peer turns into
a malicious one, it will lose all privileges.
Table 1: The transaction ratings of quality of service and quality of
recommendation.
QoS QoR Description Value
Good Good The peer is good. (0.5, 1]
Common Common The peer is correct. (0, 0.5]
Dishonest Dishonest The peer is dishonest. [−0.5, 0)
Malicious Malicious The peer is malicious. [−1, −0.5)
3.2. Trust Evaluation. Peers’ trust evaluation consists of three
parts: QoS trust value, QoR trust value, and risk factor value.
All these three parts are calculated based on the history
records of transaction ratings.We first classify the transaction
ratings based on the quality of the provided by the SN and
the RC, as shown in Table 1. We define the quality set QS =
{Good, Common, Dishonest, Malicious}. The rating Good
represents the good and honest peers, Common represents
the peers who cause some damage, Dishonest represents the
peers who provide false services or false recommendation,
andMalicious represents the peers who spread the viruses or
malicious codes. Note that the classification is flexible, and
more classes or subclasses can be introduced if it is necessary
[11, 13].
How to calculate these three parts’ trust values will be
discussed in Sections 4.1–4.3 in detail. The overall trust value
of a peer is themaximumvalue of the three parts, and let TV
𝑖,𝑗
denote the overall trust evaluation of the service provider 𝑗
from the view point of the request peer 𝑖. Let TS
𝑖,𝑗
denote the
QoS trust value of peer 𝑗, TR
𝑖,𝑗
is the QoR trust value of these
peers having transactions with peer 𝑗 in the past, and 𝑅
𝑖,𝑗
is
the risk factor value of the service provider 𝑗. Therefore, the
overall trust value for the service provider 𝑗 at request peer 𝑖
is defined as
TV
𝑖,𝑗
= max (𝛼TS
𝑖,𝑗
, 𝛽TR
𝑖,𝑗
, 𝛾𝑅
𝑖,𝑗
) , (0 ≤ 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 ≤ 1) , (1)
where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are the weights of the related trust value and
𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1.
4. Trust Calculation and Analysis of the
Resistance to Malicious Behaviors
In this section, we will present the trust calculation of our
IRTrust scheme and analyze how to resist peers’ malicious
behaviors.
4.1. Service Trust Value. Let us assume that the request peer
𝑖 finds the resource located in the peer 𝑗. The peer 𝑖 has 𝑘
transactions with peer 𝑗 in the current time cycle 𝑚. The
ratings that peer 𝑗 got from peer 𝑖 is the rating sequence
{𝑟
1
, 𝑟
2
, . . . , 𝑟
𝑘
}. Peer 𝑗’ accumulated a service trust value of the
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𝑘th transaction in the current time cycle 𝑚 which is defined
as
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘) =
{{{{{{{{{{
{{{{{{{{{{
{
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) + 𝑒
−𝑎
1
∗|𝑟
𝑘
−0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ (0.5, 1] ,
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) + 𝑒
−𝑎
2
∗|𝑟
𝑘
+0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ (0, 0.5] ,
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) − 𝑒
−𝑎
3
∗|𝑟
𝑘
−0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ [−0.5, 0) ,
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) − 𝑒
−𝑎
4
∗|𝑟
𝑘
+0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ [−1, −0.5) ,
(2)
where 𝑎
1
, 𝑎
2
, 𝑎
3
, 𝑎
4
are the adjustment factor of the accu-
mulated reputation. The function 𝑒−𝑥 decreases with the
increasing of 𝑥, the accumulated reputation of Good rating
should be better than that of Common rating, and the lost
reputation of Dishonest rating should be less than that of
Malicious rating. Thus, the adjustment factor should meet
the following conditions 𝑎
1
< 𝑎
2
, 𝑎
3
> 𝑎
4
, which merge
the accumulation function and the penalty function. The
accumulated service trust value of the current time cycle 𝑚
is defined as
AS
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑚) =
∑
𝑘
𝑖0=1
𝑉
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘)
𝑘
. (3)
If there are 𝑛 time cycles {𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑛
} from the beginning
𝑇start to the end𝑇end and peer 𝑖 has the number of transactions
with peer 𝑗 in each time cycle, the direct service trust value
TS
𝑖,𝑗
is computed directly from peer 𝑖’s historical ratings for
peer 𝑗. We define TS
𝑖,𝑗
as follows:
TS
𝑖,𝑗
=
{
{
{
∑
𝑛
𝑖1=1
AS
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑖1)
𝑛
, AS
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑖1) > 0,
0, AS
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑖1) = 0.
(4)
4.2. Recommendation Trust Value. In a fully distributed P2P
system involving numerous nodes, it is often not possible
for a request peer to directly connect the service peer and
to assess the trust value of the service provider. Instead,
the request peer needs to resort to other peers in the P2P
system and rely on the collective opinions to assess the trust.
Although some trust schemes based on recommendation
have already been proposed [2, 4, 5, 8, 9], they also lead to
new challenges, such as how to determine the accuracy of
collected opinions and how to efficiently aggregate referrals
from diverse recommenders with different trustworthiness.
The recommenders’ reputations are different from each
other.The referrals from peers with high reputation are more
trustworthy than those from peers with low reputation [2].
However, the referrals are treated equally and their credibility
are not considered. In order to neutralize different reputation
reports, Tian and Yang [10] proposed the credibility to
weigh the feedback of the referrals. The recommenders from
peers with high credibility are more trustworthy than those
from low credibility peers. In this paper, we consider the
peers in the P2P system as reflecting the characteristics of
the interpersonal relationships. Due to that the peers with
high reputation or credibility may not be willing to give
recommendations to new peers. For example, a respected
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Figure 3: Computing the jumps of referrals (color online).
famous personmay probably not write a recommendation for
a stranger whom he (she) never knows.Therefore, the weight
of the peers with high reputation or credibility may not be
the greatest for the request peer.We deem that the acquainted
peers of the request peer should have higher recommending
weights.
In IRTrust scheme, we use the jumps among peers of
the logical layer to describe the relationships. When the
jumps value is 1, the neighbors are the most acquainted
ones to the request peer. The more the jumps are, the more
remoter the relationships between the request peer and the
recommenders are. For example, as shown in Figure 3, the
service provider is peer 𝐼, the request peer is 𝐵, and the
referral peers {A, C, G, J} have transactions with the service
provider in the trust layer. In the logical layer, the jumps with
peer 𝐵 are {1, 2, 4, 6}. Maybe the reputation or credibility of
the peer 𝐽 is the highest, but the recommendingweight of peer
𝐴 is the highest.
Suppose that the peer 𝑖 has had 𝑘 transactions with peer
𝑗 in the current time cycle 𝑚. The referral peer 𝑃 got the
recommended rating sequence {𝑐
1
, 𝑐
2
, . . . , 𝑐
𝑘
} from peer 𝑖.
In the current time cycle 𝑚, we define the 𝑃 accumulated
recommendation trust value of the 𝑘th transaction as
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘) =
{{{{
{{{{
{
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) + 𝑒
−𝑏
1
∗|𝑟
𝑘
−0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ (0.5, 1] ,
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) + 𝑒
−𝑏
2
∗|𝑟
𝑘
+0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ (0, 0.5] ,
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) − 𝑒
−𝑏
3
∗|𝑟
𝑘
−0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ [−0.5, 0) ,
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘 − 1) − 𝑒
−𝑏
4
∗|𝑟
𝑘
+0.5|, 𝑟
𝑘
∈ [−1, −0.5) ,
(5)
where 𝐶
𝑖,𝑗
is the recommended rating sequence from 𝑖 to 𝑗,
and 𝑏
1
, 𝑏
2
, 𝑏
3
, 𝑏
4
are the adjustment factors of the accumulated
recommendation trust and they should meet 𝑏
1
< 𝑏
2
, 𝑏
3
> 𝑏
4
.
The accumulated recommendation trust value of peer 𝑃 in
the current time cycle𝑚 is defined as
AR
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑃,𝑚) =
∑
𝑘
𝑖0=1
𝐶
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘)
𝑘
. (6)
If there are 𝑛 time cycle {𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑛
} from the beginning
𝑇start to the end𝑇end and the peer 𝑖 has the number of transac-
tions with the peer 𝑗 in each time cycle, the recommendation
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trust value AR
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑃) is computed from the peer 𝑖’s historical
ratings for the peer 𝑃. We define AR
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑃) as follows:
AR
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑃) =
∑
𝑛
𝑖2=1
AR
𝑖,𝑗 (𝑃, 𝑖2)
𝑛
. (7)
Assume that peers {𝑃
1
, 𝑃
2
, . . . , 𝑃
𝑛
} are referrals to request
peer 𝑖 and that the relationship distances with peer 𝑖 are
{ℎ
1
, ℎ
2
, . . . , ℎ
𝑛
}. The inverse of ℎ is the weight of referrals.
If the ℎ value is too large, it means that the request node
needs to traverse the whole network, which will very strongly
increase the computational effort. Here, we use the flooding
algorithmwith TTL to search the referrals. (Themaximumof
TTL value is 7 [20–22].) If ℎ > 7 or the referral peer has left
the network, we conform its ℎ value to 10. Thus, the indirect
recommendation trust value TR
𝑖,𝑗
is defined as
TR
𝑖,𝑗
=
∑
𝑛
𝑖3=1
(1/ℎ
𝑖3
)AR
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑃
𝑖3
)
𝑛
. (8)
4.3. Risk Factor Value. The risk factor is used to describe
the probability of the service provider’s being a malicious
peer. The reputation of service trust is an accumulative value
for the past behaviors and reflects the overall evaluation
got from the responding peers. However, it is not sensitive
enough to perceive suddenly malicious behaviors of peers,
because the value is posterior, and it will be decreased after
the peer is spoiled. Thus, the risk factor is used to portray
the unpredictable and uncertain behaviors of those potential
malicious peers.
Li et al. [11] proposed the risk window to calculate the
risk. The smaller of risk window size, the more accurate the
risk assessment. But this will decrease the availability of the
resources, because less risk for cooperation is requested and
less peers are qualified to be cooperative. In R2Trust, the risk
value is computed by applying the concept of information
entropy which has been proven to be applicable in dealing
with uncertain problems [10]. In this paper, the risk factor
includes three parts: the rating risk factor (rr), the context risk
factor (rt), and the cumulative speed factor (rs).
The rating risk factor rr can be used to restrain the
simple and collusive malicious attacks. The rating risk factor
is defined as
rr =
𝑁
0
𝑁
, (9)
where 𝑁 is the number of ratings and 𝑁
0
is the number of
ratings which are less than zero.
The contexts are complete transaction records including
size, category, and time stamp.Here, we uniform the turnover
of transactions. The context risk factor is used to restrain the
strategic attack of peers. We define it as
rt =
turnover
𝑐
∑past turnover
, (10)
where turnover
𝑐
is the current transaction turnover.
The cumulative speed factor is the increased speed of trust
of a service provider. It is also used to restrain the strategic
attack which is defined as
rs (𝑚,𝑚 − 1) = AS (𝑚) − AS (𝑚 − 1)
𝑇
, (11)
where𝑚 is the current time cycle,𝑚 − 1 is the pretime cycle,
and 𝑇 is the length of time cycle. If there are 𝑛 time cycles
{𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
, . . . , 𝑡
𝑛
} from the beginning 𝑇start to the end 𝑇end,
rs =
∑
𝑛
𝑖4=1
rs
𝑖4
𝑛
. (12)
The risk factor value is the overall value of the three parts
and is defined as
𝑅
𝑖,𝑗
= max (rr, rt, rs) . (13)
The larger the risk factor value, the higher the probability
that the service provider is the malicious peer.
4.4. Simple Attack Analysis. When this kind of malicious
peers attacks, the vicious behaviors are isolated. They always
provide the inauthentic services, maliciously slander the QoS
of good peers, exaggerate the QoS of malicious peers, or fake
the peers with high reputation [1–16]. For this kind of mali-
cious peers attack, some literatures have already proposed
corresponding measures. In PeerTrust, the feedback of a peer
and the credibility factor for the feedback are used to resist
the exaggerating and slandering [2]. In R2Trust, a reputation
evaluation factor is proposed to resist themalicious behaviors
[10]. In [23], digital signature is used to restrain the fake
behaviors. In this paper, we described our measures which
can restrain these malicious behaviors.
If a peer provides inauthentic services, such as false files,
malicious code, and Trojan virus, the penalty function as
is given in (2) will reduce its service reputation quickly,
and this will seriously weaken the role of the peer in the
network. When its service reputation is low enough, the
peer will lose its effectiveness, that is, downloading and
recommending. If a peer maliciously slanders the QoS of
good peers or exaggerates the service quality of malicious
peers, its corresponding reputation will be reduced when
one of the others is communicated with the peer which
is maliciously slandered or exaggerated. Then the peer will
lose the corresponding effectiveness. To avoid a peer faking
other peers with high reputation, we adopt the authentication
technology based on identification in the process of peers’
communication.
4.5. Collusion Attack Analysis. Collusion attack is broadly
defined as any malicious coordinated behavior of a group of
users aimed at gaining undeserved benefits or at damaging
well behaved users. Thus, this kind of attack behavior is a
kind of joint attack of a group of peers. In the group, each
peer is well behaved and never provides inauthentic services
or defames the reputation of other members. But this type
of malicious peers can form a malicious cycle by assigning
a high trust value to other malicious peers in the network.
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Collusive peers provide inauthentic services to outsiders
when selected as download sources and provide denigrated
ratings for those noncollusive peers [2, 7, 24–30].
The collusive peers can hide their malicious intentions
in an unstructured P2P system by assigning high trust
value to each other. To solve this problem, Xiong and Liu
assumed that there is no similarity in the evaluation to
peers mutually, when a collusive peer does a good rating
to the target peer [2]. The tolerance to the collusive attack
has been improved to put weight on the evaluation value
by using this similarity. Sato proposed the trust estimation
method to give a defense against the collusive attack: the
maximum likelihood estimationmethod [7]. Some literatures
use encryption algorithms, game theory, and economics to
resist a collusion attack [27–30].
In this paper, being different with previous literatures,
the reputation of peers is divided into service reputation and
recommendation reputation. When peers communicate or
trade with each other, the request peer needs to evaluate the
QoS of the service peer, and at the same time, it is required
to evaluate the QoR of the peers who have connections with
the service peer. This measure can effectively resist collusion
attack. Once one of the collusion peers maliciously attacks
the request peer, not only the service reputation of the peer
but also all its neighbors’ recommendation reputation will be
punished by the penalty function as is given in (5). Namely, if
a peer maliciously attacks, the whole group will be punished.
4.6. Strategy Attack Analysis. This kind of malicious attack
behavior has a clear purpose. In the beginning, the malicious
peers are well behaved and accumulated the reputation by
honest services. Once these peers build good reputation, then
they will start to abuse their credibility to mislead other peers
[1]. They always adopt low cost to increase their reputation
when they do a strategy attack. Taking the overdraft of credit
card as an example, one person wants to overdraw the credit
cardmaliciously. First, he/she needs to increase his/her credit
in order to get more amounts. The strategy is to pay the
small overdraft back promptly. The credit is accumulated
by the frequent consumption-repayment process. When the
credit reaches to a certain degree, the person will own more
overdraft amounts. Eventually the person can overdraw all
the amounts and does not pay the debts again.
Strategy attack is also called onCoff attack in some litera-
tures. To address such potential dynamic behaviors of peers,
Xiong and Liu proposed a simple adaptive time window-
based algorithm to better react to the above behaviors [2].
Tian and Yang introduced a risk factor value and information
entropy to the trust computation in order to portray the
unpredictable and uncertain behaviors of these malicious
peers [10]. In this paper, we retain the parameter of the
context risk factor, and at the same time, we define the
reputation accumulative speed as is given in (10) and (12).
4.7. Sybil Attack Analysis. A sybil attack is the one in which
a malicious attacker subverts the reputation system of P2P
network by creating a large number of pseudonymous entities
and uses them to gain a disproportionately large influence.
The reputation system’s vulnerability to a sybil attack depends
on (i) how cheaply identities can be generated, (ii) the degree
to which the reputation system accepts inputs from entities
that do not have a chain of trust linking them to a trusted
entity, and (iii) whether the reputation system treats all
entities identically.
A sybil attack is a powerful threat faced by any decen-
tralized distributed P2P system that has no central, trusted
authority to vouch for a one-to-one correspondence between
users and identities [1]. Generally, the users only have a rating
describing how well the user behaves in a reputation system.
For example, eBay ratings are based on users’ previous
transactions with other users. Buyers and sellers in eBay rate
each other after every transaction, and the overall reputation
is the sum of these ratings over the last six months. Sybil
attacks can create a large number of sybil nodes that collude
to artificially increase a user’s rating.
The existing literatures have done some researches on
this type attack. Cheng and Friedman [17] surveyed and
found that many existing reputation mechanisms were not
resistant to this type of attack behavior. They used a static
graph formulation of reputation and formalized the notion of
sybilproofness. Yu et al. [18] proposed a detectionmechanism
(called SybilGuard) that relies on social networks of P2P users
to limit the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Quercia
and Hailes [19] proposed an effective way of identifying sybil
attackers for in-range portable devices (MobID) to reduce the
number of interactions with sybil attackers and consequently
enable collaborative applications.
In this paper, identity-based authentication techniques
are used to prevent sybil attacks and dismiss masquerading
hostile entities. When a peer joins the reputation system,
it can only be one identity, and it is not allowed to create
multiple identities. We use the SHA-1 hash function to realize
the uniqueness and the anonymity. In addition, we set the
transaction threshold 𝜙 (such as 50) to limit the permission
of the new intrant peers. Namely, the new peers only provide
service and have no permission to other operations. Once the
number of service is more than the threshold, the peers may
enter into the normal trust assessment. These measures can
effectively resist sybil attacks.
5. Experiments and Comparisons
In this section, we will present results of our experiments
which will show the effectiveness of our trust scheme. Firstly,
we repeat the EigenTrust [1], the PeerTrust [2], and the
R2Trust [10] simulator experiments using the Query Cycle
Simulator and Matlab 2008. In our evaluation, we assess the
performance of our scheme and compare it with the Eigen-
Trust [1], the PeerTrust [2], and the R2Trust [10] schemes.We
study their performance under a variety of malicious threat
behaviors (discussed in Sections 4.2–4.7). We perform 100
query cycles in our simulations and the simulation results are
the average expectations.
5.1. Simulation Environment. Considering the characteristics
of P2P networks, such as the node degree distribution with
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Figure 4: Performances of IRTrust, EigenTrust, PeerTrust, and R2Trust in simple attack (color online).
a power-law distribution, we construct the P2P network
based on a BA scale-free network to approach to real-
world networks. There are two types of peers: honest and
malicious ones. The honest peers always give the correct
service and feedback, but the malicious peers always give the
opposite opinion to others when they own the corresponding
power. In our experiments, we use the flooding algorithm
to compute the interpersonal distance between peers; the
detailed algorithm is given in the literature [20].
In the simulation we assume that there are 5000 peers
in the network. Among them, there are 500–2500 malicious
peers and the query message is flooded with TTL = 7. In the
experiment, the peer’s changing is in the uptime stage and
is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The change of issuing
queries in the uptime is uniformly distributed over [0, 0.5]. In
addition, different types of peers also vary in their behaviors
when responding to queries and providing files. For good
peers, the probability of providing authentic files is 100%.
Simple malicious peers will respond to all queries when they
have received and provide inauthentic files with a probability
of 100%. Collusive peers provide with a probability of 100%
malicious files to other peers. Other parameters in the
experiments are given in Table 2.
We compare the successful transaction rate and the
prevention accuracy rate of our scheme with the EigenTrust,
the PeerTrust, and the R2Trust under the conditions of
simple, collusive, strategic, and sybil attacks. The metrics,
successful transaction rate, is the ratio of the number of the
successful transactions over the total number of transactions.
It is typically used to evaluate the efficiency of a trust scheme
[2, 10].Theprevention accuracy rate is the ratio of the number
of successful transactions with forecasting the peer’s status
correctly over the total number of transactions.
5.2. Simple Attack. Figure 4 depicts our simulations under
the condition of simple malicious peers. In Figure 4(a),
Table 2: The parameters and their values in the simulations.
Parameters Description Value
(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)
Weight of direct trust value,
indirect recommendation
value, and peer’s risk value
(0.3, 0.2, 0.5)
(𝑎
1
, 𝑎
2
, 𝑎
3
, 𝑎
4
) Adjustment factors (3, 6, 4, 8)
(𝑏
1
, 𝑏
2
, 𝑏
3
, 𝑏
4
) Adjustment factors (3, 6, 4, 8)
𝜂 The ratio of malicious peers (0.1–0.5)
𝜙
Threshold of the number of
services 50
𝑁 The size of P2P networks 5000
when the ratio of malicious peers is low in the system,
all the four schemes perform high successful transaction
rates. With the fraction of malicious peers increasing, the
successful transaction ratio of all the schemes decreases, but it
decreases most intensely in the EigenTrust scheme. However
as a whole, the four schemes keep high efficiency, because
they punish the malicious peers. The successful transaction
ratio of EigenTrust scheme dropsmore quickly than the other
schemes because the EigenTrust schemedoes not differentiate
the reliability of all the referrals. In comparison with the
PeerTrust scheme and the R2Trust scheme, the proposed
IRTrust scheme retains a very high successful transaction
rate, and it even retains about 90% when the fraction of
malicious peers is 50%.
Figure 4(b) depicts the prevention accuracy rate of these
four schemes. Compared to all the four schemes, the rate
of the EigenTrust scheme is the least and decreases with the
increasing of the fraction of malicious peers. Although the
experimental results show some fluctuations, the rate of the
IRTrust scheme is the best and can reach 96%. But as a whole,
the four schemes keep high efficiency, because they have
punishment measures to malicious peers. In addition, the
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Figure 5: Performances of IRTrust, EigenTrust, PeerTrust, and R2Trust in collusion attack (color online).
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 20 30 40 50
Fraction of malicious peers (%)
IRTrust
EigenTrust
PeerTrust
R2Trust
Su
cc
es
sfu
l t
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
ra
te
(a) Successful transaction rate
10 20 30 40 50
Fraction of malicious peers (%)
IRTrust
EigenTrust
PeerTrust
R2Trust
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 ra
te
(b) Prevention accuracy rate
Figure 6: Performances of IRTrust, EigenTrust, PeerTrust, and R2Trust in strategy attack (color online).
R2Trust scheme and the IRTrust scheme have risk assessment
measures.
5.3. Collusion Attack. Figure 5 shows the simulations under
the condition of collusive malicious peers. Each peer in
the colluding group provides inauthentic services to the
peers outward, boosts the trust value of their accomplices
regardless of their behaviors, and downplays the trust value of
good providers. In Figure 5(a), we can see that the successful
transaction rate of the EigenTrust scheme descends obviously
when the number of malicious peers increases. Because it
does not give clear differentiations about the reliability of
all the referrals, namely, more malicious peers will lead to
more computations. Although the PeerTrust scheme owns
high efficiency, it has no risk factor of peer, and it is inferior
to the two other schemes. Compared to the R2Trust scheme,
the IRTrust scheme is designed to tackle collusive attacks
with differentiating the service and recommendation, and
therefore it is proved more robust against collusive attacks.
In Figure 5(b), we can see that the prevention accuracy
rate of the EigenTrust scheme descends evidently when the
number of malicious peers increases. Since the scheme can
not differentiate the reliability of the referrals, the more
malicious peers, the more transactions with the malicious
peers. In the PeerTrust scheme, it has community factor to
resist the collusive attack, and the R2Trust scheme uses the
relative reputation difference to identify the collusive attack.
Therefore, they can maintain a higher prevention accuracy
rate to this type of malicious attack. Compared to the rest
schemes, the IRTrust scheme is designed to tackle collusive
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 9
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Figure 7: Performances of IRTrust, EigenTrust, PeerTrust, and R2Trust in sybil attack (color online).
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attacks with differentiating the service and recommendation,
and the efficiency is stable and the highest.
5.4. Strategy Attack. Figure 6 depicts the simulations under
the condition of strategic malicious peers. Figure 6(a) depicts
the transaction rate of these four schemes. Although the
EigenTrust scheme uses the global trust value to resist this
type of attack, the demand of close cooperation of peers and
time synchronization is higher. The more peers and more
malicious ratio, the lower successful transaction ratio. The
PeerTrust can effectively restrain the strategic attack, but the
trust accuracy of PSM algorithm is affected by the width
of the sliding window. Its performance is inferior to the
R2Trust scheme and IRTrust scheme. Compared to PeerTrust
scheme and R2Trust scheme, the proposed IRTrust scheme
retains higher successful transaction rates. Even the fraction
of malicious peers is 50% and the successful transaction rate
maintains about 86%.
Figure 6(b) depicts the prevention accuracy rate of them.
To this type of malicious attack, a good idea is to keep all
the transaction records and the contexts. The EigenTrust
scheme needs to keep closer cooperation of peers and higher
time synchronization, which defends against this kind of
attack. Thus, its prevention accuracy ratio is the least which
decreases quickly with the malicious peers increasing. The
PeerTrust scheme can effectively restrain the strategic attack
by adopting the PSM algorithm, but the performance of PSM
algorithm seriously relies on the width of the sliding window.
As a result, this scheme is inferior to the R2Trust scheme
and IRTrust scheme. Compared to PeerTrust scheme and
R2Trust scheme, the proposed IRTrust scheme keeps higher
and more stable prevention accuracy rates. Even the fraction
of malicious peers is 50% and the prevention accuracy rate is
about 90%.
5.5. Sybil Attack. Figure 7 shows the simulations under the
condition of sybil malicious peers. In Figures 7(a)–7(e),
these simulations are the successful transaction ratios in
the different size of malicious peers. When the ratio of
malicious nodes is small, at the initial stage, the transaction
success rate is relatively high, but as the increase of time
period, the malicious node will attack scope which will be
larger and larger and the transaction success rate will rapidly
decline. Because these three models (EigenTrust, PeerTrust,
and R2Trust) can not distinguish sybil attacks, the more the
malicious nodes, the lower the transaction success rate. The
successful transaction ratio of the IRTrust scheme decreases
with the increasing of the fraction of malicious peers, and it
is about 85% when the fraction of malicious peers is 50%.
Figure 7(f) depicts the prevention accuracy ratio of these
four schemes. A peer joins the systemwithmultiple identities,
and it provides inauthentic services or malicious attack to
the others using one of the identities. When its reputation
is reduced by the system, the peer can exit the system and
rejoin the system with a new identity again. Although the
EigenTrust, PeerTrust, and R2Trust schemes adopt the global
trust value to restrain the malicious attack of peers, they can
not address the problemof sybil attack. In IRTrust scheme, we
use identity-based authentication techniques, set the service
threshold, and restrict the reputation accumulative ratio to
put off and restrain the sybil attack. Therefore, our trust
scheme can effectively prevent the peers’ malicious behaviors,
and the prevention accuracy ratio is stable and can keep about
90% in the simulations.
6. Conclusion
To encourage resource sharing among peers and resist mali-
cious behaviors, trust management is essential for peers to
assess the trustworthiness of others and to interact selectively
with more reputable ones. In this paper, we fully consider
the interpersonal relationships among peers and present an
IRTrust scheme. To improve the resistance ofmalicious peers,
the proposed scheme adopts the identity authentication,
distinguishes the service and recommendation, and uses the
comprehensive risk factor to prevent malicious attack and
evaluate the trustworthiness of a peer. The IRTrust scheme
is highly resistant to the malicious behavior attacks of peers,
such as simple attacks, collusive attacks, strategic attacks,
and sybil attacks. The simulation results prove that our trust
scheme performs well even when the fraction of malicious
peers in the system reaches 50%.
The study of secure network coding scheme suitable for
P2P networks is a hot topic, and the scheme and analysis
method of different attacks in this paper have potential
application in designing secure P2P network coding.
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